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World is crazier and more of it than we think, 
Incorrigibly plural... 
The drunkenness of things being various. 
    -Louis MacNeice, ‘Snow’ 
1. Introduction 
My aim in this paper may, at first glance, strike the reader as somewhat odd.  It is a 
defense of a theory of property rights which, after all, has been prevalent among legal 
theorists for most of the last century, and which is taught as a matter of routine in most 
undergraduate property-law courses in order “to disabuse entering law students of their 
primitive lay notions regarding ownership.”2 
Yet those “primitive lay notions” have been reinforced in recent years by several 
decidedly sophisticated legal theories. Among contemporary theorists, the previous 
orthodoxy is under siege, with a substantial faction now holding that the so-called “bundle-
theory” of property rights is no longer tenable, and that a robust relation of ownership of 
things can and should be re-established.3 The bundle theory may serve the purposes of “the 
                                                          
1 Early versions of this paper were presented to M.L.S. and LL.M. students at the National University 
of Ireland, Maynooth, and to the Irish Jurisprudence Society. I am grateful to those audiences, as 
well as to Sibo Banda, Garrett Barden, Brendan Curran, Brian Flanagan, John Glackin, Gerald Lang, 
Garret Ledwith, Tanya Sheridan, and Robbie Williams, for their helpful discussion of this material. I 
am also indebted to the anonymous reviewers for Legal Theory, whose suggestions greatly improved 
the finished article. 
2 Bruce Ackerman, Private Property and the Constitution 26 (Yale U.P. 1977). 
3 Hugh Breakey, Two Concepts of Property: Ownership of Things and Property in Activities, 42 Phil. 
F. 239 (2011), at 240-2. The new consensus is also evident in a recent symposium on the subject; see 
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dimmest law student”,4 according to this new consensus, but it will not serve an adequate 
account of judicial and lay reasoning about property-rights. Accordingly, the burden of proof 
rests once again upon those of us who advance a “deflationary” analysis of such rights. 
What I intend is, indeed, to “deflate” the somewhat mystical force that is seemingly 
taken by layman and neo-property theorist alike both to unify the various legal relations 
which we recognise as falling under the rubrics of property or ownership, and to imbue 
them with a distinctive moral status. The apparent unity of those concepts,5 I shall argue, is 
illusory, and largely the result of historical accident. Whatever normative force we associate 
with the concepts, moreover, is properly attributed to their component parts; no moral or 
legal conclusion can or should be drawn from the declaration that some thing is property, or 
that some person is its owner. 
I will begin the paper by sketching briefly the outlines of the – or at any rate, a – 
“bundle theory” of property-rights. I will not go into any great detail in expounding a 
particular version of it; there are, of course, as many different bundle theories as there are 
theorists, so what I will aim to present here is a way to understand the common conceptual 
core of such theories. In subsequent sections, I will consider and reject two of the most 
influential objections and alternatives to the bundle theory, advanced by James Penner and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Daniel Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property 
Symposium, 8 Econ. J. Watch 193 (2011). 
4 Ackerman, Private Property (1977), 26. 
5 Some of the philosophical literature on property has been concerned with the nature of “concepts”, 
and with the distinction, if any, between these and “ideas”; for an excellent discussion and overview 
of these issues, see Stephen R. Munzer, “Property and Disagreement,” in eds. J. Penner & H.E. 
Smith,  Philosophical Foundations of Property Law Ch. 13 (Oxford U.P. 2013). While I have a view 
on this question, I don’t believe that anything in the present argument hangs on it; and it seems 
methodologically sound to me, as far as is possible, to try and keep these two rather dissimilar sets of 
philosophical issues separate from each other.  I am grateful to an anonymous referee for bringing 
this apparent lacuna to my attention.  
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J.W. Harris. My grounds for doing so will, I hope, give some further indication of what I 
think the contours of a defensible bundle theory to be. 
I will not discuss the wider arguments made by these writers about economic and 
distributive justice. Though sympathetic to many of their concerns, I doubt that successful 
redistributive arguments will be dependent on the particular content of any distinctive and 
robust account of property or ownership. Indeed, I suspect that stipulating such accounts of 
property and ownership may amount in some cases to trying to acquire redistributive justice 
on the conceptual cheap, avoiding the hard work of detailed moral and political argument. 
But those concerns lie well beyond the scope of this paper. My own belief is that demystifying 
the notion of property and ownership would allow more rational public discourse about 
resource allocation, environmental protection, social justice, etc.; but while that is a 
motivation for the theory I develop here, it cannot be an argument in favour of its truth.6  
  
2. Hohfeld and the Bundle Theory 
The bundle theory, in its modern form, is primarily the result of work by two figures; 
Wesley Hohfeld 7  and A.M. (Tony) Honoré 8 . Hohfeld made pioneering, and perhaps 
                                                          
6 In the words of a fellow enthusiast; the bundle theory is “an analytical scheme applicable to many 
legal systems and the property arrangements within them. A virtue of such a scheme is that it makes 
few if any moral or political commitments. The analysis of property law is one thing and proposals 
for its reform are quite another.” Stephen R. Munzer, A Bundle Theorist holds onto his Collection of 
Sticks 8 Econ. J. Watch 265 (2011), at 269. 
7 Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning: And Other 
Essays (Yale U.P. 1923). Since the only commercially available editions of Hohfeld’s work at this 
time are facsimile reprints of at best intermittent legibility, the reader is invited to contest the 
veracity of all passages quoted from Hohfeld’s work in this paper. 
8 A.M. Honor , “Ownership,” in Making Laws Bind 161 (Clarendon Press 1987). Opinions differ as to 
whether Honor , who sought to outline the “liberal concept of full individual ownership” (Id.), can 
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unprecedented, efforts to impose a measure of logical rigour on legal concepts in general, 
whose influence has proved especially lasting in rights-theory; Honoré’s writings on the  
concept of property are among his most significant contributions to an extensive range of 
topics in legal philosophy and general jurisprudence. I will discuss the relevance of both to 
my argument after briefly outlining what I take to be the bundle theory’s key features. 
Although now inextricably linked with Hohfeld and Honoré, the notion of property 
rights as comprising a “bundle of sticks” predates their work.9 The bundle theory holds, at its 
most basic, that the “right” of a property-owner is separable into a series of component right-
parts; my “ownership” of some chattel may comprise, inter alia, a right of exclusion, a right 
of use, a right of possession, and a right of alienation, none of which is conceptually 
dependent on any of the others.10 The doctrine of estates in real property introduces further, 
more exotic interests; I may acquire the right of occupation in an apartment from you, 
perhaps supplemented by various easements and rights of access, though my right to 
alienate it may be restricted by the terms of the license. You may in turn have only a life 
interest in that apartment, with a reversion vesting in a relative upon your death. These 
arrangements are subject to revision over time in response to economic and social 
circumstances, and can thus vary substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with many 
local peculiarities developing. The common law envisages, for instance, such collective 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
properly be grouped with the bundle theorists; at any rate, the bundle theorists who followed made 
extensive use of his schema. 
9 The first known use of the term in this context is John Lewis, A Treatise on the Law of Eminent 
Domain in the United States 43 (Callaghan & Co. 1888); “The dullest individual among the people 
knows and understands that his property in anything is a bundle of rights.” The first metaphorical 
reference to a bundle of sticks, however, is Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Paradoxes of Legal Science 
129 (Columbia U. P., 1928); “The bundle of power and privileges to which we give the name of 
ownership is not constant through the ages. The faggots must be put together and rebound from 
time to time.” 
10 See e.g. Mosk J’s dissent, at 509-10, in Moore v. Regents of the University of California 793 P.2d 
Cal. 479 (1990). 
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provisions as those of the Israeli kibbutznik and the  American Hutterite;11 if the property is 
Irish and the owner indebted, the High Court may encumber it with a “judgement 
mortgage”.12 
The bundle theory regards these individual and separable rights, or “sticks”, as having 
no substantive, essential connection to each other. To the extent that any two or more of 
them tend to accompany each other, their conjunction is contingent rather than intrinsic; 
from a logical point of view, we might as easily have tied any other combination of the 
possible interests in the chattel or property together in the bundle. In our ordinary 
commercial transactions, we can and do take these bundles apart, redistributing the sticks 
among others’ bundles, and replacing them with new ones.13 
Who, then, is “the owner” of some particular piece of property? The question, for a 
bundle theorist, involves something like what Gilbert Ryle would have termed a “category 
error”.14 Since the number and kind of such interests in the property, all vested in different 
individuals, may be almost unlimited depending on the legal jurisdiction, it makes little 
intuitive sense to pick out any one interest-bearer as “the” owner. No particular interest or 
                                                          
11 See e.g. Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land 102 Yale L.J.1315 (1993), at 1346-8. 
12 See J.C.W. Wylie, Irish Land Law, 4th ed. 867-884 (Bloomsbury Professional, 2010). 
13 In practice, the number and form of such fragmentations and redistributions permitted is limited by 
the so-called numerus clausus principle, principally as a result of the in rem nature of property 
rights that will play a large part in this discussion; see T.W. Merrill & H.E. Smith, Optimal 
Standardisation in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 Yale L.J. 1  (2000), 
and Joseph Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society 94 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1009 (2009), at 1021-9. For a beguiling account of the complexities of property-right 
arrangements, however (and of the degree to which the lay public’s understanding of their subtleties 
often outstrips that of legal specialists), cf. Robert C. Elickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute 
Resolution Among Neighbors in Shasta County, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 623 (1986). As detailed below, 
there are also relations of logical entailment between e.g. duties and their correlative rights; we may 
regard these, however, as instances of the same stick viewed from different perspectives. 
14 See Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind 16ff. (Hutchinson 1949).  
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right, and moreover no particular combination of those interests and rights, is either 
necessary or sufficient to establish ownership.15 “The lawyer, ...” as Jeremy Waldron notes, 
“will not be interested in finding out which of [the various parties] really counts as an owner. 
His only concern is with the detailed contents of the various different bundles of legal 
relations.”16 
Any unitary notion of “ownership”, then, denoting a single canonical relation between 
person and property, seems to drop out of the legal picture altogether, surviving as a mere 
“folk-legal” concept in the discourse of laymen. Among the cognoscenti, even Ackerman’s 
“dimmest law student” recognises that the term is at best an imprecise place-holder for what 
really matters – which individual bears the particular stick or sticks relevant to the legal 
dispute in question. 
That, at any rate, is the essence of the bundle theory of property rights. “Property” and 
“ownership” are therefore amorphous or “shapeless” concepts,17 failing to consistently pick 
out any determinate legal relation or set of legal relations. Rather, their extension changes 
from one occasion to the next; while everyday talk ascribes an essence or “core” content to 
the concepts of property and ownership, no such entity in fact exists. For the bundle theorist, 
then, the terms represent a sort of primitive hangover from outdated theories which legal 
science has now dispelled, in much the way that character-traits like courage and romance 
are still widely credited to the heart. 
                                                          
15 A fee simple interest with possession in land is widely considered to be the closest analogue to 
“absolute” ownership; nevertheless, even such an interest is subject to potential statutory 
restrictions on bequest, or to compulsory purchase by the state. See e.g. both the majority opinion by 
Brennan J and the dissent of Rehnquist J in Penn Central Transportation Company v. City of New 
York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
16 Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property 29 (Clarendon 1988). Cf. R.A. Posner’s discussion 
of the “train-sparks”; Economic Analysis of Law 8th ed. 63 (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2011). 
17 Cf. e.g. Simon Kirchin, The Shapelessness Hypothesis 10 Phil Imprint (2010). 
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The theory has a distinguished philosophical lineage. It might not have been approved 
by Hume himself, but is certainly in the spirit of his injunction to “commit to the flames” as 
sophistry and illusion anything which was neither observable (like the sticks) nor knowable a 
priori.18 Indeed, my claim is that it represents a special case of what David Lewis termed 
“Humean Supervenience”, or “the doctrine that all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of 
local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another.”19 That is to say, 
anything true we can say about the world ultimately reduces to statements about the 
distribution of perfectly natural properties and relations; there are no necessary connections 
between the individual perfectly natural properties and relations; and those perfectly natural 
properties and relations are the intrinsic properties of sub-atomic particles and the spatio-
temporal relations between them. 
“Supervenience”, more generally, is a philosophers’ term of art for a relation between 
sets of properties; A-properties supervene on B-properties  if and only if all differences in A-
properties must be accompanied by differences in B-properties. Thus, for instance, the 
brittleness of objects is said to supervene on their physical micro-structure; if one 
windowpane is more shatter-resistant than another, then the atoms composing the two must 
be differently arranged. Conversely, a different arrangement of atoms does not entail a 
different level of brittleness, and my coffee mug may be just as prone to shattering as either 
windshield, while clearly being differently constituted. 20 
                                                          
18 David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding s.12, pt.3. (L.A. Selby-Bigge & P.H. 
Nidditch eds., Oxford U.P. 1978). 
19 David Lewis, Philosophical Papers vol. II ix (Oxford U.P. 1987).; cf. Helen Beebee, The Non-
Governing Conception of Laws of Nature, 61 Phil. Phenom. Res. 571 (2000). 
20 See e.g. Jaegwon Kim, “Concepts of Supervenience,” in Supervenience and Mind: Selected 
Philosophical Essays (Cambridge U.P. 1993). Brian McLaughlin & Karen Bennett, Supervenience, 
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2011/entries/supervenience/ provides an accessible 
introduction to the topic. 
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For the sub-atomic particles discussed by Lewis, we may substitute individual “sticks” 
in the bundle of property-rights. The bundle theory holds, then, that anything we wish to say 
about what are commonly termed “property” and “ownership” can be said by reference 
exclusively to the properties of the sticks in question, that none of those sticks or their 
properties are necessarily connected with or related to any of the others,
21
 and that nothing 
above and beyond these sticks and their properties and relations is of relevance to “true” – 
that is, legally valid – judicial decision-making. Statements about “property” and 
“ownership”, in every case, are therefore either redundant – being reducible in full to their 
constituent claim-rights – or simply false, invoking mysterious entities of which we have 
neither evidence nor a coherent understanding.22  
                                                          
21 This is not to say, pace Henry Smith, that the bundle theory must attribute the fact “(t)hat sticks 
come in standardized clumps—fee simple, defeasible fee, life estate, future interests, easements, and 
so on” to mere “happenstance” (H.E. Smith, Property is not just a Bundle of Rights 8 Econ J Watch 
279 (2011), at 284). That the relations are not necessary or intrinsic does not mean they must be 
merely arbitrary. Thus, it is entirely inaccurate to charge bundle theorists with analysing a 
hypothetical diamond by “counting atoms” and ignoring important causal features of its physical 
structure (ibid., at 279); what is denied is not that those causal features exist, but that they exist 
necessarily. Cf. Henry E. Smith, Property as the Law of Things 125 Harvard L.R. 1691 (2012), at 
1709ff. 
22 Perhaps the best know expression of this view is the criticism of Local 1330, United Steel Workers 
v. United States Steel Corp. 631 F.2d 1264 (1980) in Joseph Singer, The Reliance Interest in 
Property, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 611 (1988). The justices, Singer argues, “wrongly defined the issue as a 
search for the ‘owner’ of the property. They then assumed that, in the absence of specific doctrinal 
exceptions to the contrary, owners are allowed to do whatever they want with their property” (at 
621). To search for “the owner” when many parties have compelling interests, he argues, “is 
fundamentally wrong. It is simply not the right question. To assume that we can know who property 
owners are, and to assume that once we have identified them their rights follow as a matter of 
course, is to assume what needs to be decided” (p. 637-8). Instead, the courts ought to “decide who 
wins the dispute on grounds of policy and morality, and then ... call that person the owner” (p. 638).  
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In metaphysical terms, the bundle theory is therefore like any Humean theory a 
naturalist, and an anti-essentialist, position. It is naturalist, insofar as it denies the existence 
of any further relation of “property” or “ownership” over and above the specific claim-rights; 
once these have been inventoried, there is nothing more the law needs to know. It is likewise 
anti-essentialist, because it denies that there is any particular “core” claim-right, or set of 
such rights, which determines how the concepts of “property” and “ownership” are to be 
applied. Depending on the variant, it may deny outright that any legal relation or group of 
such entities exists which corresponds to those concepts (an anti-realist bundle theory), or it 
may hold that numerous such relations or collections of them correspond to the concepts, 
which may be defined in any number of ways according to judicial convenience, and none of 
which possesses any special theoretical significance (a “promiscuous realist” bundle 
theory). 23  But for practical purposes, the difference between these variants is merely 
notational. 
The greatest impetus to the bundle theory’s popularity came from the work of Wesley 
Hohfeld, who first demonstrated that the apparent unity of the property- and ownership- 
relations in fact concealed a myriad of distinct legal relations, in particular claim-rights, 
privileges, powers, and immunities.24 Understood thus, moreover, it became clear that the 
property- and ownership-relations could be understood not as holding between a person and 
a thing, but rather – and less mysteriously – as holding between a great number of persons 
                                                          
23 See e.g. John Dupré, The Disorder of Things; Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science 
(Harvard U.P. 1993). 
24 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 96-7. The most important precursors to Hohfeld’s theory 
are Henry Terry, Some Leading Principles of Anglo-American Law (T & J.W. Johnson 1884), John 
Salmond, Jurisprudence, Or, The Theory of the Law (Stevens & Haynes 1902), and John Chipman 
Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law (Columbia U. P. 1909); Joseph Singer, The Legal Rights 
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence 6 Wis. L. Rev. 975 (1982) provides a useful summary of its 
historical context and development. 
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regarding a thing.25  Accordingly, Hohfeld proposed to replace the traditional distinction 
between rights in rem and in personam with a new terminology; 
A paucital right, or claim (right in personam), is either a unique right residing 
in a person (or group of persons) and availing against a single person (or single 
group of persons); or else it is one of a few fundamentally similar, yet separate, 
rights availing respectively against a few definite persons. A multital right, or 
claim (right in rem), is always one of a large class of fundamentally similar yet 
separate rights, actual and potential, residing in a single person (or single 
group of persons) but availing respectively against persons constituting a very 
large and indefinite class of people.26 
Thus, following and quoting with approval the position of Holmes CJ, 27  Hohfeld 
declared that the apparent distinction in kind could be reduced to a mere difference in 
                                                          
25 For a clear recent expression of the contrary view, holding that Hohfeld and his successors have got 
things “exactly backward” in this regard (at 1692), see Smith, Property as the Law of Things. 
Smith’s view is that the “information costs” of keeping track of such a myriad of interpersonal 
relationships renders the Hohfeldian view radically impractical (see note 50, below), and that 
property therefore provides “a platform for the rest of private law” (at 1691) by simplifying these 
relationships as a much smaller and standardised number between persons and things. But the 
bundle theory, as Smith  acknowledges (1605ff.), is an “analytical device”, which aims at revealing 
the fundamental nature of property-relations and quotidian property-talk; that it is usually far more 
efficient to abbreviate the multitude of fundamental relations into the everyday vocabulary is not 
something that bundle-theorists commonly deny, any more than physicists will typically eschew talk 
of the ordinary physical objects and properties which they nevertheless hold to be analysable 
without remainder into arrangements of sub-atomic particles and their properties. 
26 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 72. 
27 “All proceedings, like all rights, are really against persons. Whether they are proceedings or rights in 
rem depends on the number of persons affected.” Tyler v Court of Registration 175 Mass. 71 (1900), 
at 76. Cf. O.W. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. R. 1 (1894). 
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quantity; a supposed right in rem was simply a great many rights in personam bundled 
together; 
Suppose that A is the owner of Blackacre and X is the owner of Whiteacre. Let it 
be assumed, further, that, in consideration of $100 actually paid by A to B, the 
latter agrees with A never to enter on X's land, Whiteacre. It is clear that A's 
right against B concerning Whiteacre is a right in personam, or paucital right; 
for A has no similar and separate rights concerning Whiteacre availing 
respectively against other persons in general. On the other hand, A's right 
against B concerning Blackacre is obviously a right in rem, or multital right; for 
it is but one of a very large number of fundamentally similar (though separate) 
rights which A has respectively against B, C, D, E, F, and a great many other 
persons. It must now be evident, also, that A's Blackacre right against B is, 
intrinsically considered, of the same general character as A's Whiteacre right 
against B. The Blackacre right differs, so to say, only extrinsically, that is, in 
having many fundamentally similar, though distinct, rights as its 
"companions." So, in general, we might say that a right in personam is one 
having few, if any, "companions"; whereas a right in rem always has many 
such "companions."28 
Note that the apparent distinction between contractual and property-rights has also 
vanished; Hohfeld finds such merely formal, extrinsic distinctions
29
 spurious where the 
underlying substance of the right in question is invariant.  
                                                          
28 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 76-7. 
29 Cf. Mossoff’s reading of State v. Shack, 277 A.2d N.J 369 (1971); “Shack is a prime example of how 
property rights disintegrate under the bundle conception of property ... Under such an approach, 
there is nothing really left to property that distinguishes it from any other in personam legal 
entitlements that the government distributes and regulates.” Adam Mossoff, “The False Promise of 
the Right to Exclude,” 8 Econ. J. Watch 255 (2011).  For another relevant example, consider the 
lease/license dichotomy; see e.g. Wylie, Irish Land Law, at 1095 ff. 
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A final significant feature worth noting in Hohfeld’s analysis is the so-called 
“Correlativity Axiom”,30 which joins the concepts of claim-rights, privileges, powers, and 
immunities with their respective correlates of duties, no-rights, liabilities, and disabilities. 
The axiom states that there is a symmetrical relation of strict implication between each pair; 
to take the most relevant and well-known example of rights and duties, my right of exclusive 
possession of an apartment strictly implies everybody else’s corresponding duty to exclude 
themselves from it, and vice versa.31 Since the correlation is axiomatic, it is nonsensical to see 
the right as arising from the duty, or the duty from the right, “(j)ust as a slope’s downward 
direction is not prior or posterior to its upward direction – either logically or temporally.”32 
The claim is not an empirical one; that every duty is owed to the holder of a right, and every 
right held against the bearer of a duty, is a purely analytical consequence of what the terms 
“right” and “duty” mean.33 
                                                          
30 The term is coined in Mathew H. Kramer, “Rights Without Trimmings,” in A Debate Over Rights: 
Philosophical Enquiries ed. M.H. Kramer, N.E. Simmonds & Steiner Hillel 7-112, at 24. (Oxford U.P 
2000); “For Hohfeld, rights and duties … were always correlative by definition. … He posited the 
correlativity of rights and duties as a definitional fundament of his theory, by explicating the 
concepts of ‘right’ and ‘duty’ in such a way that each entails the other; each is the other from a 
different perspective.” 
31 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 38 cites Lake Shore & M.S.R. Co. v. Kurtz 10 Ind. App. 
60 (1894) (“‘Duty’ and ‘right’ are correlative terms. When a right is invaded, a duty is violated.”), and 
cognate passages in Howley Park Coal etc. Co. v. L. & N.W. Railway 1 A C 11 (1913) and Galveston 
etc. Railway Co. v. Harrigan 76 S W 452 (1903). 
32 Matthew H. Kramer, “Legal and Moral Obligation,” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory ed. Martin Golding & William Edmundson 179-90, at 188 (Blackwell 2005). 
33 Ernest Weinrib traces this insight about correlativity to Kant and Hegel: see Ernest Weinrib, Legal 
Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 Yale L. J. 949 (1988), at 998-9; Ernest 
Weinrib, Law as a Kantian Idea of Reason, 87 Colum. L. Rev. 472 (1987) , at 493, 495. The relevant 
passages seem to be those at G.F.W. Hegel, Outlines of the Philosophy of Right 56-7 (Stephen 
Houlgate trans., Oxford U.P. 2008) and Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals §18-21 (Mary 
Gregor trans., Cambridge U.P. 1996). However, H.S. Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the 
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The other major figure in the development of the bundle theory, as previously 
mentioned, was Tony Honoré, whose influential elaboration of Hohfeld’s analysis 
distinguished eleven “standard incidents” of ownership.34 While we need not consider each 
of these in detail, they now form the canonical list of sticks in each bundle, on which the 
“truth”, or legal validity, of judicial determinations about property must supervene.  
Yet although we may for most purposes, and for the sake of convenience, speak of 
these “incidents” as the sticks or judicial “atoms”, the true import of Holmes and Hohfeld’s 
analysis is rather more radical; the “ultimate” sticks of which the bundle is comprised are not 
these eleven, but each of these eleven as indexed not only to each individual right-holder and 
duty-bearer (your right of possession over Blackacre as held against me, and as held against 
my neighbour, are after all separable), but to each potentially detachable part of the things 
over which the rights are held (for you may partition Blackacre and sell me a right of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Early History of Society and Its Relation to Modern Ideas 269-70 (John Murray 1861)  has argued 
further that no distinction between rights and duties existed in Roman law; see Kenneth Campbell, 
Legal Rights, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/legal-rights/. 
34 Namely: the right to possess; the right to use; the right to manage; the right to the income; the right 
to the capital; the right to security; the incident of transmissibility; the incidence of absence of term; 
the duty to prevent harm; liability to execution; and residual character (Honor , “Ownership” at 165-
79). An alternative list is suggested by Dean Pound; ‘a jus possidendi or right of possessing, a right in 
the strict sense; a jus prohibendi or right of excluding others, also a right in the strict sense; a jus 
disponendi or right of disposition, what we should now call a legal power; a jus utendi or right of 
using, what we should now call a liberty; a jus fruendi or right of enjoying the fruits and profits; and 
a jus abutendi or right of destroying or injuring if one like.’ Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and 
Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. 993 (1939), at 997. B Björkman & S O Hansson, Bodily Rights & 
Property Rights, 32 J. Med. Ethics 209 (2006) neatly compares further alternative schema due to 
Henry Sidgwick, Lawrence Becker, and others. 
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possession in the eastern, but not the western, half).35 Since the sticks are so infinitesimal, it 
is little wonder that theorists have written of the “disintegration” of property.36  
 
3. Penner’s “Unified Concept”  
So much for the bundle theory, as it has descended to us through Hohfeld and Honoré, 
and as I propose to defend it against the recent attacks. Why has its popularity declined so 
sharply in recent decades, to the point that recent theorists of property, in the course of 
outlining their own views, can regard it as abundantly refuted, and in no need of further 
discussion?37 Even during its ascendancy, the contrary idea, of “an integrated notion of 
property existing prior to and informing the law,”38 remained attractive for a variety of 
reasons, including its congruence with laypersons’ intuitions, and the purported ability “to 
explain the clear meaning and use of the term in theory and practice”39, as well as to ground 
wider arguments about the justice of particular distributions of property. In particular, such 
                                                          
35 Many cities, as I am grateful to an anonymous commentator for pointing out, have regulations that 
prohibit splitting city lots in two in this manner. There are, of course, excellent pragmatic reasons for 
regulations of this sort, which minimise the “information costs” imposed by excessively baroque, 
exotic, or fine-grained distributions of property-rights; some theorists (see note 50, below) have 
made these costs the basis of their opposition to the bundle theory. But according to the bundle 
theory, these are contingent, rather than essential connections between sticks, and there is nothing 
in the nature of property which determines that regulations must exist to link them in this way. 
36 Thomas C. Grey, “The Disintegration of Property”, in eds. Pennock & Chapman, NOMOS XXII: 
PROPERTY (New York U.P. 1980), at 69. For a very clear exposition and rebuttal of Grey’s 
somewhat extreme view by a fellow bundle-theorist, see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 
(Cambridge U.P.1990), at 31-36. 
37 e.g. Breakey, Two Concepts of Property. 
38 Id., at 241. 
39 Id. 
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a notion has been thought to provide a bulwark against “statist” confiscatory practices.40 As 
previously stated, I don’t propose to discuss the issues of distributive justice in the course of 
this paper. Rather, I will focus on the ways that the concepts of ownership and property are 
meant and used, according to some of the more influential critiques of the bundle theory, 
with the aim of exposing a number of misunderstandings or misrepresentations of the 
theory. What these alternative theories share, which the bundle theory denies, is the focus on 
some supposed “standard” relationship that an owner might have to a particular physical 
resource, which they take to be paradigmatic of property and ownership in general. 
The first such view I want to consider is that of James Penner. In a lengthy (110 pages) 
paper41 and a subsequent monograph42 he outlines both a critique of the bundle theory, and 
an alternative, “unified” concept of property, which rests on two main claims; the “Exclusion 
Thesis”, and the “Separability Thesis.” I will focus on the critical, rather than the positive, 
aspect of his theory; if his criticisms of the bundle theory prove unsuccessful, then the 
positive account loses both its motivation and many of its basic assumptions. 
Penner’s critique begins inauspiciously. “Hohfeld,” he writes, “was mad for symmetry 
between rights and duties, and he based his notion of the correlativity of rights to duties on 
it.”43 But as we have seen, with what Kramer termed the “Correlativity Axiom,” Hohfeld 
identifies a logical equivalence between X’s holding a right against Y, and Y’s having some 
correlative duty towards Y. That equivalence is not merely the expression of some irrational 
                                                          
40 Klein & Robinson Prologue, 196-201 provide a range of quotations to this effect; but cf. Richard A. 
Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Harvard U. P., 1985), which 
argues that the bundle theory itself – by making each “stick” a compensable taking – serves this 
protective function. This argument is reiterated in Richard A. Epstein, Bundle-of-Rights Theory as a 
Bulwark Against Statist Conceptions of Private Property, 8 Econ. J. Watch  223 (2011). 
41 James Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. R. 711 (1996). 
42 James Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford U.P. 1997). 
43 Penner, Idea of Property 25. 
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aesthetic whim of Hohfeld’s; it is, prima facie, a function of the very meaning of the terms.44 
So when Penner concedes that anybody believing in the correlativity of rights and duties is 
“pretty much bound to describe a right in rem as a multitude of rights in personam,” 45 but 
reassures us that “(n)o one without a commitment to Hohfeld’s views regarding symmetry 
need define correlativity in this way,”46 he owes us rather more than the expression of 
personal aesthetic preference for asymmetry, and  rejection of the in rem-in personam 
reduction as implausible, that we are given. What we really need, and are nowhere given, is a 
wholly new account of the normal meaning of “right” and “duty”, which establishes that they 
are independent, and unrelated, concepts.  
Let us charitably suppose that some such definition of those terms is available, and 
acceptable. Why does Penner consider the equivalence of in rem and in personam rights to 
be implausible? The difference between the two which Hohfeld’s analysis omits, he argues, is 
that for a right in personam – unlike a right in rem – it matters which particular person is 
the duty-bearer or the right-holder. 
Consider the familiar Blackacre. “If A owns Blackacre,” writes Penner, “then he may 
grant any number of rights in personam to specific or specifiable people to make use of it, 
walk across it, and so on. But it matters to A who they are, and it matters to them who A is.”47 
A must know who they are in order to grant them the right, and they must know who A is 
and the scope of his rights in order to assess the content of their license. But in the matter of 
rights in rem, as when someone wishes to purchase Blackacre, no such personal familiarity 
with A is required;  
                                                          
44 Cf. Walter Wheeler Cook, “Introduction,” in Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions; “Any given 
single relation necessarily involves two persons. Correlatives in Hohfeld’s scheme merely describe 
the situation viewed first from the point of view of one person and then from that of the other.” 
44 Penner, Idea of Property 25-6. 
45 Id. 
46 Id., at 26. 
47 Id. 
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(t)hey may never see him, or hear about him, or even know if he has died and 
been replaced as owner by his younger sister. Their only relationship to him is 
through his property, in the sense that they can affect A only by acting on his 
property in some way. To them, A is only represented as his property, and 
what’s more, he is not even represented as A. He is only represented as ‘owner’, 
i.e. his particular identity is completely obscure. This is no relation in personam 
between them and A. It is exactly the same relationship that everyone has to all 
the property that is not their own.48 
This is not an especially novel point. Indeed, it will be familiar to logicians and 
philosophers of language as a case of the de dicto/de re distinction.49 Consider the phrase 
“the tallest boy in the class”; this picks out one determinate individual. But in semantic 
contexts such as belief- and desire- ascription or “modal” claims about possibility and 
necessity, termed “referentially opaque”, such a phrase may be ambiguous. In the sentence 
“Mary wants to kiss the tallest boy in the class,” the phrase may refer to that specific person, 
or it may function as a general description, which any number of others might have fulfilled 
in other circumstances. Suppose that Mary believes Henry to be the tallest boy; the sentence 
does not specify whether she wishes to kiss Henry in particular, or whichever boy happens to 
be tallest (perhaps she is mistaken, and Henry is in fact marginally shorter than Ben, who 
slouches). If it is Henry alone that she desires, the sentence should be interpreted de re, or as 
pertaining to the “thing” identified by the phrase; if instead she desires the tallest boy, 
regardless of who he may be, the sentence should be read de dicto, or as pertaining to the 
“words” of the phrase itself. 
Something of this sort, I take it, is at the root of Penner’s concern. If I am granted a 
license in personam to walk Blackacre by its owner, I must have the ability to identify him, 
and the phrase “the owner of Blackacre” should consequently be read de re. But if I am not 
granted such a license, I have like everybody else a duty in rem towards “the owner of 
                                                          
48 Id., at 27. 
49 Introduced by W.V. Quine, Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes, 53 J. Phil. 177 (1956). 
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Blackacre”, whoever that may be (i.e., read de dicto). “Owing individuated, separate duties 
to particular property-owners would presumably require knowing what owners held what 
property in order to understand what those duties are,” writes Penner. “But we don’t. And 
that’s because our duty is not to trespass on the property of others. We are under one duty to 
the plurality of property holders however their property is distributed among themselves.”50 
The question here, which Penner appears to beg, is why I must have personal 
knowledge of somebody’s identity in order to hold a right of or bear a duty towards them in 
personam. We might suppose that I must have such knowledge if I am claiming a special or 
exceptional right; if I am asserting, for instance, that I unlike everybody else have been 
granted a license to walk Blackacre. But that would only be the case, if true, because the 
exceptional nature of my right, as against the “default” rights and duties of everybody else, 
would require it to be specifically granted.51 This in no way entails that the rights and duties 
we assume in default of being specifically exempted – such as the duty to avoid trespassing 
                                                          
50 Penner, Idea of Property 27. Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, What Happened to Property in 
Law and Economics? 111 Yale L. J. 357 (2001) use this as the basis for their influential “information-
cost account” of property-as-exclusion; see also Larissa Katz, The Regulative Function of Property 
Rights, 8 Econ. J. Watch  236 (2011), at 239, Henry Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in 
Property, 160 U. Penn L. Rev. 2097 (2012), and Smith, “Emergent Property,” in eds. Penner & 
Smith,  Philosophical Foundations of Property Law Ch. 14, especially §V. My own view, which 
coincides with Munzer’s (in his “Property and Disagreement”), is that “context and heuristics”, as in 
any area of human life, reduce the supposed cognitive burden of in personam property-rights 
considerably.  
51 Even then, the right might be granted to me de dicto and without personal acquaintance as, for 
instance, “the individual renting the Gate Lodge of Blackacre” or “the oldest single man in the 
village”; de re reference and personal knowledge are not necessary for in personam rights. For this 
reason, we can dismiss Penner’s later concern that in personam rights “have their specific right-
holders and duty-owers essentially” and that the title embodied in those rights cannot therefore be 
transferred to others (Penner, Potentiality, Actuality, and ‘Stick’-Theory, 8 Econ. J. Watch 274 
(2011), at 277). I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this point to my attention. 
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on the property of others – are any less in personam than the exceptional ones we are 
granted specifically. When Penner “presumes” that we must know which owners (de re) hold 
what property in order to understand our in personam duties, he is helping himself to just 
what is at issue; the claim that an undifferentiated duty in rem cannot be reduced to a 
multitude of individual in personam duties. 
Suppose that Mary, some years later, is out walking in the countryside. She happens 
upon Blackacre and briefly considers taking a shortcut across it. “I had better go the long way 
around,” she tells herself eventually, “since I have a duty to Blackacre’s owner not to trespass 
on the land.” Suppose further that Mary believes her old schoolgirl crush Henry to be the 
owner; nothing about the legal nature of the duty hangs on whether or not her belief is 
correct. Whoever the owner is, Mary bears an (otherwise) identical duty to that person not to 
trespass. The distinction between de re and de dicto meanings can be problematic, but only 
in contexts of “referential opacity,” when the intended reference of the sentence may fail. 
Since the law does not traffic in such statements,52 the ambiguity identified by Penner cannot 
be legally significant. 
Against the view that property is “a structural composite”, Penner goes on to propose 
an alternative view of property as “a single right protecting a single, identifiable interest.”53 
The argument for this conclusion is “essentially a burden of proof argument, drawing on the 
intuition of Occam’s razor.”54 This invocation is surprising, to say the least; William of 
                                                          
52 Actually, this is not quite correct. I suspect, for instance, that a case of de re/de dicto opacity in the 
context of a demonstrative reference – as discussed by David Kaplan, On the Logic of 
Demonstratives, 8 J. Phil. Logic  81 (1978) – may be the best theoretical explanation of the 
celebrated distinction between the common-law contract cases Cundy v. Lindsay  3 App. Cas. 459 
(1878) and Lewis v. Averay (No. 1) 1 Q.B. 198 (1971). But that is another paper’s work; the claim is 
sufficiently accurate for our current purposes.  
53 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture  739. 
54 Id. 
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Ockham’s injunction that entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem55 would serve 
perfectly as an epigram for the bundle theory, and its insistence that the phenomenon of 
property can be fully explained on the basis of the individual “sticks”, without any appeal to a 
wider, all-encompassing relation of “property-ownership”. 
Penner, though he elsewhere explicitly divides his alternative account into an 
“exclusion thesis” and a “separability thesis,”56 states his view of property most succinctly 
thus;  
The right to property is the right to determine the use or disposition of an 
alienable thing in so far as that can be achieved or aided by others excluding 
themselves from it, and includes the right to abandon it, to share it, to license it 
to others (either exclusively or not), and to give it to others in its entirety.57 
This certainly captures much of the intuitive force of the folk-legal concept of “property”. 
However, the attempt to shoe-horn various aspects of property-law into – and various other 
aspects of law out of – this concept of a “single, coherent right”58 can only be described as 
tortuous.59 The problem is not that Penner is unsuccessful in the two hundred or so pages 
                                                          
55 “Entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” 
56 Penner, Idea of Property ch. 4-5. 
57 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture  742. 
58 Id., at 754. 
59 Here is the summary of just a single instance, from Penner, Idea of Property 131; “My submission 
about the proprietary character of choses in action, then, is that to the extent that we regard choses 
in action, these rights in personam, as property rights, we do so because of their relative ‘personality 
poverty’ in relation to other rights in personam. What makes these problematic property rights is 
the fact that while the relationship is humming along and parties are meeting their obligation, when 
banks are honouring their depositors; balances, dividends are paid, and debt payments are made on 
schedule, these rights fulfil very much the role of property that money does. When things go awry, 
however, when holders are apt to lose shareholder suits or actions against their debtors, the rights 
revert, in a sense, to their in personam origins.” 
21 
 
which the endeavour takes up. The problem, reminiscent of Thomas Kuhn’s famous account 
of the Copernican Revolution,60 is rather that such an extensive effort is necessary at all. As 
Kuhn describes, the Ptolemaic astronomers who predated Copernicus believed the sun and 
planets to orbit the Earth in “cycles” of perfectly circular form. As more and more accurate 
observations began to be made, however, it became necessary to postulate further circular 
oscillations around the cycles themselves – “epicycles” – to preserve the theory. By the time 
of Johannes Kepler, who first questioned the utility of the epicycles, the ad hoc patches 
which were necessary to support the geocentric/circular orbits theory had become absurdly 
complex. What distinguished the Copernican theory was not that he could make better and 
more accurate predictions, for he could not; rather, it was the fact that his theory did not 
need to be supplemented by such a massively complicated auxiliary structure to bring it into 
line with observation. A sufficiently determined theorist, both Quine and Duhem 
demonstrated, can reconcile any recalcitrant data whatsoever with his theory;61 the question 
for Penner is not whether or not his efforts are successful, but whether or not they are worth 
the trouble.62 
There remain, in any case, theoretical problems with Penner’s analysis. Penner draws a 
contrast between the bundle theory and his own on the basis of the individuation of 
particular rights; where the bundle theorist must believe such rights to be discreet and 
determinate, like “(m)embers of a club [which] naturally come in units called persons”, 
Penner holds that they are in fact like “pieces of a cake which can be sliced in any way we 
wish;” they are “no more than momentary functional descriptions made with a particular 
legal concern in mind.” 63 
                                                          
60 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions 140, 322-4 (U. of Chicago P. 1962).  
61 W.V. Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism 60 Phil. Rev. 20 (1951). Pierre Duhem, The Aim and 
Structure of Physical Theory 180 ff. (Princeton: Princeton U. P. 1954). 
62 See also the criticisms of Penner’s position in Adam Mossoff, What is Property? Putting the Pieces 
Back Together? 45 Ariz. L. Rev. 371  (2003), at 376-8. 
63 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture  754-5. 
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That this is so, Penner believes, can be seen by reflecting on what happens when 
someone grants another a license to use their property. On the bundle view, “A, the owner, 
holds in his bundle of rights the millions of rights of B to do each and every thing with A's 
property, and the millions of  rights of C, and D, ad infinitum. On the grant of a license to B, 
A merely extracts the particular right from his bundle with B's name on it and transfers it to 
B. If it is a non-exclusive license, then A can do the same in turn for C or D.”64 The prospect, 
he writes, “boggles the mind.”65 
Yet this consequence, that the bundle theory entails the existence of a “mind-boggling” 
number of discrete rights, should be neither surprising nor troubling. In outlining the bundle 
theory, I compared the rights not to “sticks” in a bundle, but to “atoms” of property; the 
Humean supervenience thesis to which I compared the bundle theory is specifically one 
about how our everyday talk about the world is ultimately dependent on, and reducible to, 
talk about the sub-atomic particles of modern physics. The number of such particles making 
up the world may indeed be mind-boggling; but no physicist supposes that the physical 
world therefore has the structure of cake and “can be sliced in any way we wish”. No matter 
how many such atoms there are, they are nevertheless individually discreet; Penner would 
hardly suppose that the members of Barcelona Football Club fail to be individuated simply 
because there are 170,000 of them. 
Penner re-states his argument as follows;  
we can actually conceive of property in terms of a right which permits an owner 
to do anything or nothing with his property; the disaggregative bundle of rights 
thesis insists that an owner may do everything with his property. The former 
view accords with the fact that the law of property takes no interest in the 
particular use one makes of one's property (which is not to say that criminal 
law or the law of taxation does not); the latter holds that the essence of property 
                                                          
64 Id., at 758. 
65 Id. 
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is an infinite number of rights to use a thing, in the same way that the 
Hohfeldian idea of a right in rem entails having millions of rights against all 
other people.66 
But phrased this way, the incoherence of his position becomes clear; there is simply no 
formal difference at all between “anything” and “everything” in this context. In any 
imaginable calculus of rights, the two notions will be expressed by exactly the same universal 
quantifier; “For all rights x, A may exercise x, or grant it to B.” Once again, Penner insists on 
an intuitive distinction premised on the existence of some special property or entity which 
exists over and above the elements into which it can be formally analysed without – in the 
mathematical sense – remainder. 
The ultimate reason for clinging to this distinction, Penner calls the “uselessness 
thesis”; the bundle theory involves “at least the tacit admission, that the concept of ‘property’ 
is vague or undefinable, and so ... degenerate or useless.”67  If the theory is true, he reasons, 
the deflationary concept of “property” that it advances can add nothing to our understanding 
of property law or judicial decision-making. For Thomas Grey68, this means that the entire 
concept, though retaining some use at the “folk-legal” level, must ultimately be confused. On 
a more moderate view, like Barry Hoffmaster’s, the concept is conclusory; “A statement of 
ownership is a conclusion drawn from comparing a particular combination of the incidents 
of ownership, existing together in a determinate situation, with the paradigm of 
ownership.”69 In other words, judges will make a decision in any given case on the basis of 
the particular rights and duties of the parties, and of the particular demands of justice in the 
                                                          
66 Id., at 758. 
67 Id., at 769. 
68 Grey, Disintegration of Property. 
69 Barry Hoffmaster, Between the Sacred and the Profane: Bodies, Property, and Patents in the 
Moore Case, 7 Intell. Prop. J. 115 (1992), at 129. Cf. Munzer, A Theory of Property 39; Larissa Katz, 
Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U. Toronto L. J. 275 (2008), at 276. 
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circumstances, and retrospectively declare a property right to have, or not to have, 
obtained.70 
To show the problem with the “uselessness thesis”, Penner examines the famous cases 
of International News Service v. Associated Press71 and Moore v. Regents of the University 
of California 72 . In International News, Pitney J for the majority determined that the 
plaintiffs, by re-publishing “hot” – but non-copyrightable – news gathered by the 
defendants, had infringed the plaintiffs’ “quasi property.”73 Like the dissents by Holmes and 
Brandeis JJ, this seemed perfectly to illustrate the conclusory view. 
“Instead of talking about ‘quasi property’ or ‘exchangeable values’,” wonders Penner, 
“are we not on a better footing if we can say that what the Associated Press was claiming was 
the right to a market monopoly, akin to the protection generally provided by the monopolies 
of copyright or patent law?”74 Such a “property right to a legally structured market position”, 
he argues, makes more sense than “(j)amming rights to the news or to an idea into the mold 
of property rights.”75 Yet this characterisation of the conclusory view is plainly inaccurate, 
and still wedded to the idea of the property-concept as determinate. There is no need to 
“jam” such rights into a “mold”; the property-concept, according to the bundle theory, is 
“shapeless”, and more akin to a blanket we may simply throw loosely over whatever 
considerations we wish it to cover. It is hard to argue, moreover, that Penner’s “unified 
                                                          
70 Cf. W.H. Hamilton & I. Till, Property, 12 Encyclopedia  Soc. Sci. 536 (1933); “It is incorrect to say 
that the judiciary protected property; rather they called that property to which they accorded 
protection." See e.g. the famous Australian case of Victoria Park Racing and Recreation Grounds 
Co. Ltd. v. Taylor 58 C.L.R. 479 (1937), as well as Sports and General Press Agency Ltd. v. "Our 
Dogs" Publishing Co. Ltd 2 K.B. 880 (1916), 2 K.B. 125 (1917). 
71 International News Service v. Associated Press 248 U.S. 215 (1918). 
72 Moore v. Regents of the University of California 793 P.2d Cal. 479 (1990). 
73 International News, at p. 235-36. 
74 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture 816. 
75 Id. 
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concept” of property has made judicial reasoning easier to predict if the “naive but 
accurate”76 intuition he appeals to finds all three Supreme Court opinions in a landmark case 
confused. 
In Moore, where the plaintiff sought to have his property rights recognised in cells 
excised from his body during surgery for leukaemia, which were later the subject of several 
patent lines, Penner’s account is similarly at variance with actual judicial reasoning. Panelli 
J, writing for the majority, denied the claim in conversion, on the grounds that a relevant 
statute “eliminates so many of the rights ordinarily attached to property that one cannot 
simply assume that what is left amounts to ‘property’ or ‘ownership’.”77 Yet Penner rejects 
both this and the other opinions by Mosk J – who explicitly invokes the bundle theory78 – 
and Broussard and Arabian JJ for failing to consider the question whether “(e)ven if one can 
regard the control rights we have over our body parts as somewhat akin to ‘ownership,’ is 
there nothing more to be said before we treat something as intimately related to the human 
persona as one's body as property?”79 
The bundle-theorist’s answer, and that adopted by each of the justices in Moore, is 
simply “no”; the facts of the case, and the particular bundle of sticks involved, provide a 
complete basis on which to reach the decision, and no concept merely supervening upon 
them need be invoked to explain the outcome. Penner thinks this entails “(t)he idea that 
some magic occurred on [Moore’s spleen’s] removal so that the researchers could claim a 
property right in it as if claiming something unowned the instant it left his body.”80 Once 
more, however, the criticism only works if one is wedded to a substantive concept of 
“property”. If “a property right” is itself nothing magical, but merely the label we attach ex 
                                                          
76 Id., at 817. 
77 Moore, at 492. 
78 See note 10, above. 
79 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture 721. 
80 Id., at 817.  
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post to any sub-bundle of the sticks sufficient to decide the case, then there is just nothing at 
all mysterious about that “right” transferring when certain of its constituent sticks do. 
I leave the discussion of Penner with one final point, which appears to have gone 
unremarked in the subsequent literature. To sustain the “unified” concept of property in the 
admitted absence of necessary and sufficient conditions for its application, Penner overturns 
the entire standard field of “Classical” semantics, relying instead on an alternative view 
based on Jonathan Sutton’s unpublished B.Phil. thesis.81 I offer no opinion here on the 
merits of Prof. Sutton’s “criterial” semantics, save to note that it has not yet displaced the 
mainstream view. To completely revise our understanding of linguistic meaning for the sole 
purpose of preserving a particular theoretical view of legal rights would surely be to break a 
butterfly upon the proverbial wheel. That Penner does so in the name of “a burden of proof 
argument, drawing on the intuition of Occam’s razor”82 is doubly curious. 
 
4. Harris’s “Minimal Structure” 
The final anti-bundle argument I shall consider is that of Jim Harris. Harris’s main 
work on the subject83 is careful and detailed, but it can occasionally be difficult to identify a 
particular structure to the overall argument. Accordingly, I will deal with the main points in 
approximately the order he raises them. 
He begins, oddly enough, by effectively conceding one of the central claims of the 
bundle theory. Although “all of us (philosophers, lawyers, and ordinary folk) seem to share 
an intuitive idea of what property is,” 84  there is “no univocal, singular concept of 
                                                          
81 Id., at 767ff.; J.K. Sutton, Family Resemblance: An Externalist Approach to Metaphysics (B. Phil. 
thesis, Oxford University). 
82 Penner, The ‘Bundle of Rights’ Picture 739.  
83 J.W. Harris, Property and Justice (Oxford U.P. 1996). 
84 Id., at 7. 
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ownership” 85  or property to reckon with. Indeed, on a number of occasions he refers 
explicitly86 or implicitly87 to the notion of a “bundle” of rights. On what grounds, then, does 
Harris reject the bundle theory? Although no single concept can do justice to property rights, 
he argues, we can identify a minimal core of necessary conditions, based on “the twin notions 
of trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum,”88 which is then extended in a variety of 
directions by different legal systems, in response to different circumstances and desiderata. 
The first stage of Harris’s argument is to attempt to fix our intuitions about property by 
the use of a series of anthropological thought experiments, termed Forest Land, Status Land, 
Red Land, Contract Land, Wood Land, and Pink Land, progressively advancing both in the 
type of resources available to residents and the local rules limiting their use.89 Harris’s 
method is to demonstrate that one concept is “logically prior” to another by showing that an 
anthropologist from one imaginary society could only understand another’s practices in terms 
of his own group’s. But this seems a clear non sequitur; we may at best conclude from these 
stories that concepts like private property are descriptively prior to alternatives given the 
limits of the hypothetical anthropologist’s conceptual resources. 
Harris’s imaginary societies might be unobjectionable, if their purpose were simply to 
establish the outlines of his own intuitions about property; but they are useless in 
investigating how those intuitions line up with reality.90 Yet he immediately begins drawing 
lessons about necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of property institutions; 
                                                          
85 Id., at 132; cf. J.W. Harris, “The Elusiveness of Property,” in Perspectives on Jurisprudence: Essays 
in Honour of Jes Bjarup, ed. Walgren 123-32, 129 (Stockholm Institute for Scandinavian Law 2005). 
86 Harris, Property and Justice  47, 51. 
87 Id., at 73. 
88 Id., at 5. 
89 Id., at 15ff. 
90 For a stark contrast with the potential utility of actual empirical anthropological studies, see e.g. E. 
Adamson Hoebel, Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in the Study of Primitive Law, 51 Yale 
L.J. 951  (1942). 
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lessons that simply repeat the assertions made about his own intuitions in the course of 
describing the imaginary societies. Before long, the discussions will have “yielded the 
conclusion that the core idea of a property institution resides in the twinned conceptions of 
trespassory rules and the ownership spectrum.”91  
If the elements of the “minimal structure” are of dubious provenance, the 
“sophisticated structures,”92 which Harris insists must be built upon it for the purposes of 
the full range of modern property-talk, are patently gerrymandered. Example after example 
is force-fitted in or out of the schema in the same epicyclical manner we saw in Penner, in 
openly vague and arbitrary fashion; “if one poses the question, who is the owner of this 
house or flat?, answers will refer only to those with leases of a substantial duration, although 
usage points to no particular cut-off point.”93 The result, he freely admits, “is a portmanteau 
category,”94 delineated only by “a stipulative boundary.”95 
In defence of this position, Harris argues that in the absence of such a unified, albeit 
heterogeneous, concept, “we would have to regard as baleful”96  the everyday claims of 
entitlement to particular items of social wealth. This may be the aim of some more radical 
critics of property, but there is no obvious reason why we cannot, per Thomas Grey,97 leave 
the folk-concept intact for everyday use, and rest the actual legal claims of entitlement on the 
individual “sticks” themselves.  
Harris defends his jury-rigged property concept against some of those radical critics by 
arguing that the property-scepticism of Alf Ross and Karl Olivecrona; 
                                                          
91 Harris, Property and Justice 55. 
92 Id., at 42 & ff. 
93 Id., at 72. 
94 Id., at 86. 
95 Id., at 62. 
96 Id., at 63. 
97 See n.62 above. 
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is based on a theoretical assumption about the ontological status of conceptual 
entities: either they directly reflect brute reality, or they are metaphysical 
chimera and their employment must be explained away in psychological terms. 
It ignores the possibility that the human mind may create abstract entities 
which human institutions can then usefully employ for a variety of functions, 
without it having to be supposed that the entities belong to some mysterious 
supra-sensible realm.98 
This is perfectly true, as far as it goes; artificial, even socially-constructed, kinds (such as 
money, or lawyers) are no less real, objective features of the world than “natural” kinds 
(such as water, or dogs). But there is a further, perfectly obvious distinction between these 
artificial-but-real kinds and the sort described by Nelson Goodman as grue-some, 
exemplified by the heterogeneous property of being “grue”; green if examined before time t, 
and blue if examined thereafter.99 Some artificial kinds, that is, do reflect the real contours of 
our world, but this will not license just any portmanteau category; “kosher” is a potentially 
useful scientific classification, whatever one’s faith,100 but “kosher, or yellow, or smaller than 
a bread-bin” is not. Pointing out that concepts of the former sort are legitimate does not 
absolve charges that Harris’s “portmanteau concept” is of the latter sort. The human mind 
may indeed create abstract concepts, but it should not simultaneously “eschew any ‘true’ 
semantic or conceptual essence”101 of those concepts if it wishes them to be regarded as 
faithful to reality, carving nature at the proverbial joints. 
Harris’s rival view of property and ownership, then, is unsupported by any persuasive 
line of argument. However, he makes direct criticisms of two aspects of the bundle theory, 
                                                          
98 Id., at 131. 
99 Nelson Goodman, “The New Riddle of Induction,” in Fact, Fiction, and Forecast ch. 3 (Harvard 
U.P. 1954).  
100 Cf. Kim Sterelny & Paul E. Griffiths, Sex and Death: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Biology 
196 (U. Chicago P. 1999) 
101 Harris, Property and Justice 142. 
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which its proponents will be concerned to rebut. The first of these again concerns the 
Correlativity Axiom, while the second decries the “conclusory view” of the role of the 
property concept in judicial decision-making as tautologous. 
The root of Harris’s attack on the Correlativity Axiom is, once again, an apparent 
misunderstanding of the in rem-in personam reduction. The common view holds, he argues, 
that the layman thinks in terms of relations between persons and objects, while the lawyer 
knows that the relevant relations are between people, and concerning the objects in 
question. “The contrast,” he insists, “is a false one.”102  
Indeed it is, but it also seems a straw man. Nothing in Hohfeld’s or Honoré’s 
arguments, as Harris himself acknowledges,103 suggests that we must cease to speak or think 
even loosely about legal relations between persons and objects; their aim is to analyse such 
talk, not to eliminate it. The point is, in other words, that we can better understand the 
nature of those legal relations if we reduce them to relations between persons. The bundle 
theory requires no more; it displays the underlying logical structure of such relations, but 
does nothing thereby to undermine them. 
The reduction is possible, Harris agrees, if two conditions are met; “first, that all the 
relevant legal provisions are known and determinate – no open texture; and, secondly, that 
we are seeking to convey information about the legal situation at a particular moment in 
time.”104 Without going into the details of Harris’s discussion of the second condition, let us 
agree that he has identified an important qualification to the bundle theory as previously 
elaborated.105 At the end of section two, I identified the “sticks” composing a typical bundle 
as corresponding to each of Honoré’s incidents, indexed to each particular potential right-
holder, duty-bearer, and detachable part of the object in question. Since I may convey an 
                                                          
102 Id., at 119. 
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105 The issue also seems to be alluded to in Penner, Idea of Property 25. 
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interest in the object to you for a limited period of time only, we should say further that the 
incidents are indexed to the individual temporal parts of the detachable portions of the 
object.106  
The first condition, whose terminology is drawn from Hart,107 requires that it may not 
be an open question whether or not a given instance of conduct falls under the scope of the 
right.108 A right in rem which is not open-textured in this way will straightforwardly reduce 
to a bundle of rights in personam whose scope is similarly known and determinate. What is 
the problem with open-textured rights in rem? According to Harris, judicial decisions 
regarding such rights, lacking a determinate basis in precedent, must appeal to the values of 
ownership generally. But in doing so, they must either be brute and tautologous in their 
conclusions, or they must invoke a particular relation between persons and things.  
In short, Harris’s objection to the Correlativity Axiom is also an objection to the 
“conclusory view” of property’s role in judicial reasoning. In Bradford v. Pickles,109 the 
plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendant from sinking a well under his land under the law 
of nuisance, as his sole purpose in doing so was to prevent water from percolating to their 
waterworks, thereby forcing them to purchase the land from him. The Lords upheld the 
lower court’s refusal of an injunction, explicitly invoking Mr. Pickles’ “rights as a landowner” 
to use his property in a self-interested manner, even if doing so was “churlish, selfish, and 
grasping.”110 In other words, argues Harris, the court argued from Pickles’ general, in rem 
rights over the land to his specific, in personam entitlements against the Mayor and Council 
                                                          
106 For the standard definition of “temporal parts”, see Ted Sider, Four-Dimensionalism 60 (Oxford 
U.P. 2001). 
107 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 124-36 (2d ed. Clarendon Press 1994). 
108 For instance, when carbon trading regimes are first instituted, a new class of economic assets is 
created. It then seems to be an open question who “owns” and is entitled to trade the credits newly 
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110 Id., at 600-1. 
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to act as he did. If the in rem rights were simply equivalent to the in personam rights, as the 
bundle theorist claims, the judgement expresses an uninteresting tautology; “Pickles is 
privileged to do this and the Corporation has no right to stop him because Pickles is 
privileged to do this and the Corporation has no right to stop him.”111 
The obvious query to raise here is; what about this objection is specific to open-
textured rights? The judgements in cases decidable on precedent, where Harris has no 
objection to reducing the in personam rights to in rem rights, would be no less tautologous 
by this reasoning. This is our first indication that the “tautology” in question may not be 
especially problematic.  
Let us look in more detail at the nature of a judgement of this sort. According to Harris, 
the giving of a verdict changes the question from open- to closed-textured; “(t)he House 
having ruled as it did, the law as stated at any subsequent time includes a no-right/privilege 
relationship in such circumstances, and that will continue to be true unless the House of 
Lords overrules that decision or it is abolished by statute.”112 That is to say, the effect of a 
judgement in an open-textured case is just to recognise another stick. 
Whether we consider this new stick to be created de novo by the decision (“judge-
made”) or to have been in force since the dawn of legal time, albeit never previously 
elaborated (the “pre-existence thesis”) is for current purposes irrelevant.113 The important 
question is why, according to Harris, we must interpret the decision as the assertion of a 
general principle of ownership which he admits to be subsequently decomposable into 
individual rights, rather than as the recognition of an additional right which contributes to 
our after-the-fact ownership-conclusions. Why, that is, must judicial reasoning be “top-
                                                          
111  Harris, Property and Justice, p. 124. Cf. also Brian Leiter’s discussion of “conceptual rule-
skepticism”; Brian Leiter, “American Legal Realism,” in The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of 
Law and Legal Theory ed. Martin Golding & William Edmundson 50-66, at 61-3 (Blackwell 2005). 
112 Harris, Property and Justice, p. 124. 
113 Donna Lyons, Dworkin and Judicial Discretion: A Critical Analysis of the Pre-existence Thesis, 11 
Trinity C. L. Rev. 1 (2008) summarises the main issues with exemplary clarity. 
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down” from ownership to sticks, rather than “bottom-up”? 114  Certainly, given the 
heterogeneous and jury-rigged nature of the “portmanteau” top-down ownership-concept 
Harris has outlined, he cannot commend it to us on the basis of legal certainty or theoretical 
elegance. 
The supposed basis, then, which must apply equally in the case of closed-textured 
questions, is that of tautology; reasoning from a (newly-augmented) bundle of rights to a 
conclusion which merely restates the existence of that bundle would be both repetitious and, 
Harris claims, uninformative. Repetitious it might well be; but tautologies are uninformative 
only if we do not already possess the information they express. Since the term “water” refers 
to H2O, the sentence “water is H2O” means “H2O is H2O”; but the discovery of water’s 
chemical make-up was no uninteresting triviality.115 Similarly, even if we regard the decisions 
in Bradford v. Pickles, or International News Service, or Moore, as formally tautologous, 
they nevertheless express interesting, and decidedly consequential, discoveries about the 
extent and distribution of the proprietary interests assertible under the common law. 
 
5. Conclusion 
I have offered a defence and, I hope, a clarification of the bundle theory. I want to 
summarise here briefly why I think that it is the only successful, and the most theoretically 
attractive, account of property rights available to us. 
The major innovation of my position, the feature that is most likely to come as a 
surprise to anyone already familiar with at least the text-book or lecture-hall accounts of the 
bundle theory, will be the number and minuscule scope of the individual rights which 
compose a typical bundle. The classic theoretical justification of the bundle theory, I have 
argued, applied in a thoroughgoing manner, does not merely require us to consider 
separately the different “incidents” of ownership identified by Honoré, separately indexed to 
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– as Hohfeld pointed out – each potential right-holder and duty-bearer. That quantity of 
rights already strains the “bundle of sticks” metaphor to the limits; such a number of sticks 
would be less a bundle than a lumber-yard. 
As I contend, we need to go further; each of those sticks is decomposable not just into 
the all the separate spatial parts in which interests could be conveyed to others, but also into 
all the separate temporal parts indicating the limited durations for which an interest can be 
conveyed. The numbers are now well beyond even lumber-yard quantities; they are in a 
literal sense astronomical. It is just that multitudinous character that offended Penner, yet I 
believe it actually assists us in understanding the bundle theory by providing the new 
metaphor that several theorists have recently called for;116 the individual rights may be best 
thought of not as “sticks”, but as “atoms”. To that end I have drawn on an influential theory 
from the metaphysics of science – David Lewis’ “Humean supervenience” – to illustrate the 
relation the individual rights have, both to each other and to the judicial decisions and 
everyday property-talk for which they provide the whole and unique basis. 
When we get this metaphor clear, just like the older “bundle” metaphor, we see two 
reasons to prefer the deflationary theory it expresses to the accounts of property which rely 
on the existence of some entity over and above the individual “sticks” or “atoms”. The first is 
that, since the individual rights can give a complete account of property-talk, invoking 
anything further is superfluous and inelegant; entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter 
necessitatem. The second is that, in fact, no such further entity has been observed “in the 
wild”, nor convincingly postulated; and it is far from clear even what sort of entity it would 
have to be. The inflationary fetish, that ascribes to “property” and “ownership” an intrinsic, 
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unexamined, and thing-like status,117 therefore adds nothing to our abstract understanding 
of property rights, nor does it shed any light on the actual processes of judicial reasoning. 
“Commit it then to the flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.” 
                                                          
117 Cf. Harris, Property and Justice, p. 256. 
